The wartime operational control (OPCON) issue between South Korea and the U.S. Eighth Army-led United Nations Command (UNC) has seen changes since 1950 through 1978, upon the inauguration of the Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) in Yongsan, Seoul. Since then, only peacetime operational control was transferred to the Korean Joint Chiefs Command in 1994. The other more critical component, the wartime operational control enforcement matter has continuously been under discussion for around 48 years.
Whenever we mention transfer of wartime operational control, there is never a consensus on its true concept.
Three different but confusing model examples mention Korea earning a "return," "recovery" and "transfer" of the wartime operational control. Return means going back to an earlier situation or doing something again. Recovery is to find or get back something lost, especially from a place where it should be retrieved from someone. Transfer, however, denotes moving someone or something from one place to another.
Neither return nor recovery is an adequate term. Since the UNC — established in 1950 by the United Nations Security Council resolution against the bellicose North Korea — was a combat-chain command against any potential on-the-spot provocation of war inside the Korean territory, the exercise of wartime operational control should be followed in accordance with the joint policy declaration of 16 war-fighting nations and in parallel with clauses of the Korean armistice agreement kept for 73 years.
Transfer seems to fairly represent the switch of the CFC-led UNCs wartime operational control from one to another. The UNC, whose authority derives from the 1953 Korean armistice, is now in a position to put more weight on the security of Taiwan, the Philippines, Guam or mainland United States against alleged threats from China and North Korea. South Korea is receiving more calls to shoulder a heavier defense capacity against the North Korean regime.
Given the unique and exceptional security context on the Korean Peninsula since the 1950-53 war, there should be neither exaggeration nor misunderstanding in considering changes to wartime operational control aimed at strengthening unity and coordination within the shared bilateral framework between the Republic of Korea and the relevant United Nations authorities.
Under the continued threats of nuclear and ballistic missiles on the part of North Korea, which has even participated in Russias war on Ukraine, wartime operational control is a necessary requisite for South Korea to fulfill its heavier national defense posture. That would mean spending 3.5 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, demanded by U.S. President Donald Trump and accepted by President Lee Jae Myung.
Lee Sun-ho (wkexim@naver.com) is a freelance columnist living in Seoul. The views expressed in the above article are the authors own and do not reflect the editorial direction of The Korea Times.
[츮 ڵ]
ȯ ν
ѱ ̱ (OPCON) 8 ̲ ɺ(UNC) 1950 1978 ѹα ̱ ÷ ȭ ȭ 鼭 1978 ѹ̿ձ ɺ(CFC) Ἲ 꿡 ־ϴ. ķ, 1994 Ǹ ѱ յο ̰Ǿϴ. ߿ 48 ǵǾ Խϴ.
, ѱ 信 Ǵ ̷ ʽϴ.
ٸ ȥ ÿ ѱ return, recovery, transfer ȹѴٴ մϴ. Return Ȳ ưų ٽ 𰡸 ϴ ǹմϴ. Ư Լ ȸǾ ҿ Ҿ ã ǹմϴ. ȯ ̳ ҿ ٸ ҷ ű ǹմϴ.
ȯ ȸ ƴմϴ. UNC 1950 ȣ ѿ Ϸ UN ̻ȸ ǿ ٿ , ѱ ߿ Ǿ ɺοǷ, 16 å 73Ⱓ ѱ װ Ͽ մϴ.
CFC ֵ UNC ٸ ȯǴ ϰ ٷ ߸ Դϴ. UNC 1953 ѱ Ե , ߱ 븸, ʸ, Ǵ ̱ Ⱥ ū ΰ ֽϴ. ѹα ǿ ſ ɷ δ㽺 û ް ֽϴ.
1950~1953 ѹݵ Ưϰ Ⱥ Ȳ , ѹα 籹 ڵ ü հ ȭϱ Կ ־ ̳ ذ մϴ.
ź ̻ ϰ , þ ũ̳ £ ϰ ֽϴ. ѱ ſ ڼ ϱ ʼ Դϴ. ̴ ̱ 䱸ϴ ѻ(GDP) 3.5% Ѵٴ ǹԴϴ. ε Ʈ û Ͽ Ƹ ɿ Ƶ鿴ϴ.
̼ȣ(wkexim@naver.com) £ ϴ ĮϽƮԴϴ. 翡 ǥ ش ̸, The Korea Times ݿ ʽϴ.